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THE MORALITY OF OBEDIENCE 
Joseph Raz* 
A THEORY OF LA w. By Philip Soper. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 1984. Pp. ix, 190. $16.50. 
Over the past few years Professor Soper has published several arti-
cles displaying an acute power of analysis, a fair-minded treatment of 
the views of theorists for whom he has little sympathy, and a capacity 
to cut through the detail of complex arguments and reach to their 
heart. 1 In them he was moving towards an independent stance. This 
elegantly written book contains the fruit of this search. 
The book can be divided into three parts. The first, mainly in 
chapter one, discusses method in legal philosophy. The second, con-
sisting mainly of chapters two and five, unravels Soper's views on the 
nature of law. The third, mainly in chapter three, is a completely new 
argument for the existence of an obligation to obey the law - any law, 
be it good or bad, just or unjust. Chapters four and six interpret and 
support defenses of the novel doctrines advanced in the rest of the 
book. Each of the main themes is introduced through a discussion of 
the work of some of the theorists Soper disagrees with. The book in all 
its parts is Soper's response to the challenge he addresses to all legal 
and political theorists: What is the difference between law and a 
merely coercive order? All other theories are found wanting. Either 
they fail to identify the difference or they fail to explain it, they fail to 
see its point. Soper's ambition is to remedy both defects. I will not try 
to summarise the book, but will concentrate on the main message con-
veyed by each of its parts. 
I. PROBLEMS OF METHOD 
Soper's novel theory of law belongs to the recently fast-expanding 
family of theories holding that the answer to the question "what is 
law?" depends at least in part on evaluative considerations. But per-
haps uniquely among adherents of this approach, he believes in the 
viability of the alternative approach. It is possible, he implies, though 
pointless, to inquire into the question "what is law?" in a way that is 
devoid of evaluative presuppositions. It is here, I shall argue, that he 
* Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. D.Phil. 1967. - Ed. 
1. See, e.g., Soper, Legal Theory and the Problem of Definition (Book Review), 50 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 1170 (1983); Soper, Metapho-,;s and Models of Law: The Judge as Priest, 15 MICH. L. R.Ev. 
1196 (1977); Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, 15 
MICH. L. R.Ev. 473 (1977). 
732 
February 1985] Morality of Obedience 733 
goes astray. Perhaps paradoxically, this mistake leads him to misiden-
tify and exaggerate the role of evaluative considerations in a theory of 
law. 
Trouble starts with the first introductory chapter. Soper raises the 
question which has always proved to be the Achilles' heel of philoso-
phy: What is it good for? His answer is that there is no possible point 
to legal philosophy if it is not to answer the question "what ought one 
to do?" From this he concludes without further ado that its task is to 
answer the question: "What is law that I should obey it?" Indeed he 
sees this as no more than a restatement of "what ought I to do?" (p. 
7). The question "what is law?" which is addressed in the rest of the 
book is understood as a quest for such a description of the law which 
will make obedience to it obligatory. The first step towards a theory 
was accomplished. One fundamental tenet of law was discovered: 
Necessarily, law is such that it is obligatory to obey it.2 I shall call this 
Soper's basic maxim. 
Chapters four and six show that he does not regard the method-
ological argument for the basic maxim as sufficient. While the basic 
maxim is one of the main props for his theory of law, its own accept-
ability depends on the acceptability of his legal and political doctrines. 
The whole argument of the book hangs together. One result of this is 
that my strictures on the basic maxim depend on the cogency of my 
rejection of the other theses of the book. Still one has to start some-
where, and what better place can there be than Soper's own starting 
point. 
Soper is quite modest about his claim. He thinks that at the end of 
the day whether or not the law ii) such that it is necessarily the case 
that one has an obligation to obey it is like the question whether the 
drawing which can be seen as either duck or rabbit is a drawing of a 
duck or of a rabbit.3 It is not clear, however, whether Soper is really 
seeing a duck or a rabbit. Let us assume that the purpose of legal 
theory is to advance the inquiry into what we ought to do. Does it 
follow th~t describing the essential features of law as a political system 
of authoritative rules, determining, among much else, when the use of 
force is permissible, prejudges the issue (p. 10)? On the contrary, there 
can be no progress in deciding what is to be done in the political 
sphere except by focusing attention on the prominent features of social 
institutions, features which may make a difference to the issue of 
obedience. 
If the law is to be obeyed it is because of its character as a system 
(contributing to) organizing social relations by special means or 
2. This conclusion is implicit in Soper's revised statement of the question: What is law that I 
should obey it? See also p. 13 ("I believe that the phenomenon of prima facie obligation is univer-
sally associated with the institution of law .... "). 
3. P. 14. See generally ch. 6. 
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through the operation of special institutions. If it ought not to be 
obeyed then this too is due to those same facts. By identifying the law 
at the outset as a system we are obligated to obey, Soper does not 
advance the inquiry. He does not provide us with any considerations 
which may determine what ought to be done. We are offered by him 
the advice: If an act is required by law, then, other things being equal, 
we are obligated to perform it. But we pay a high price for it. We lose 
our grip on the question "what is required by law?" We thought, and 
Soper appears to endorse this thought (p. 2, and elsewhere), that at 
least the answer to this is clear. Law is a system of rules which are 
recognised and used by some or all of its subjects. We have ways of 
identifying the ways they do so. We may travel to Outer Mongolia, to 
Chile, to South Africa, to Uganda, or to any other country in the 
world. While being ignorant of many nice questions concerning its 
law we will find it rather easy to identify its central legal institutions 
and regulations. 
Not so if we accept Soper's basic maxim. This will require us first 
to establish whether those regulations ought, morally speaking, to be 
obeyed. Only if we are duty-bound to obey them (or perhaps only if 
that country's citizens are so obligated) are they law. The question of 
the existence of a moral obligation is not one we can answer simply by 
observing which are the country's legislative and judicial institutions. 
It is not a matter on which we can take the word of the country's 
lawyers or citizens as settling the issue. Even if they accept Soper's 
theory of law we cannot assume that their judgment of whether they 
are living under a legal system is trustworthy. It is quite posible that 
the vast majority of those subject to Nazi rule thought that Nazi rules 
ought to be obeyed. It is more than possible that if they did, they were 
badly in the wrong. 
If we follow Soper we will find that legal theory does not tell us 
what is the law of Germany or France or of any other country, for that 
. is not its job, nor does Soper claim that it is. But equally the views and 
conduct of the legal officials of those countries, the opinions and ac-
tions of its legal profession and of its citizens, will not determine what 
is its law. If the identity and content of the law of a country cannot be 
determined by reference to the opinions and conduct of the popula-
tion, the legal profession and the legal institutions of that country, 
then we are as far from knowing what we ought to do as we ever were. 
Soper's basic maxim, far from advancing our understanding of what 
we ought to do, blocks our way to answering that question. 
Where then did Soper go wrong? Why did he not see that the road 
to an answer to his main question, "what ought to be done?", goes 
through solving a whole series of subsidiary questions each of which 
advances us some of the way? We need to know the economic con-
comitants and the emotional make-up of monogamous marriages 
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before we can judge whether we ought to get married or not. We must 
establish the consequences of training in academic institutions and of 
apprenticeship methods of training before we can judge which form of 
training to prefer for ourselves or for others. Similarly, we ought to 
establish the prominent features of law as a political system before we 
can decide whether it ought to be obeyed. 
The methodological separateness of the question "what is the 
law?" from the question "ought it to be obeyed?" does not mean that 
the answer to the first does not advance the second. On the contrary, 
the first must be separate from the second in order to advance it. As I 
mentioned at the outset, Soper's mistake is to think that if the ques-
tions are separate they are unconnected. For him the view that one can 
provide a theory of what the law is without advance commitment to a 
particular answer to the question "ought it to be obeyed?" means that 
the theory of law is not in any way tied to the normative quest. This is 
a deep mistake. A theory of what the law is strives to identify its 
central, prominent, important features. What makes a feature promi-
nent or important or central is inescapably and inevitably an evalua-
tive question. It is important if it bears on what matters. In large 
measure it is precisely the fact that certain features are relevant to 
what one ought to do which marks their importance. 
It is crucial to remember, however, that we can and often do know 
that a feature of a scheme or an institution is relevant to its evaluation 
without knowing whether it makes it good or bad. The fact that pri-
mary education is compulsory is recognised by all as important to its 
evaluation, regardless of whether they take it to be one of the strengths 
or a weakness of our educational arrangements. 
In recent publications I have argued for a theory of law based on 
these methodological perceptions.4 But they are far from new. While 
not all the theorists generally identified as legal positivists endorsed 
them, they stood at the cradle of legal positivism. Bentham never dis-
guised the fact that his utilitarianism was the spring of some, though 
not of all, of his main jurisprudential doctrines. His doctrine of the 
individuation of laws and his views on the natural arrangement of the 
law, for example, are directly dependent on his utilitarian faith. Sig-
nificantly, both are designed to bring out aspects of the law which are 
of practical concern, without prejudging whether they show the law to 
be good or bad. 5 
A theory of law is, as Soper and others claim, tied to the normative 
quest. But the tie to be productive must be partial and indirect. Gen-
4. See THE CoNCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 213-16 (2d ed. 1980); THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 
37-52 (1979); Law, Authority and Morality, THE MONIST, forthcoming July, 1985; The Problem 
about the Nature of Law, 21 W. ONTARIO L. R.Ev. 203 (1983). 
s. See J. BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (2d ed. London 1823) (1st ed. n.p. 
1776). 
736 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:732 
eral evaluative considerations inform us what features are relevant to 
the question "what ought one to do?". We then look to the law, as a 
social institution familiar in our culture, the likes of which is also to be 
found in other countries of different cultures, and see how it fares in 
terms of these features. Once that is done we have answered the ques-
tion "what is law?" in a way which advances our ability to decide 
whether we ought to obey it, without prejudging it. 
II. MISUNDERSTANDINGS 
The above simplified account of the way the normative quest af-
fects the theory of law is much too crude. But it serves to vindicate 
my opening remark that Soper's failure to see that the theoretical in-
quiry into the nature of law is indissolubly impregnated with evalua-
tive presuppositions leads him to misconceive the role such 
presuppositions should play in it. It also prevents him from seeing the 
force of theories he is most concerned to criticize. While I do not wish 
to comment in detail on Soper's review of the leading theories of to-
day, it is necessary to show how the distortion embedded in the basic 
maxim sometimes leads to misinterpretation. 
The task of criticism is discharged in chapter two. Its first half 
deals in some detail with several major tenets of Austin's, Kelsen's and 
Hart's legal theories (and with some views of mine). The second sum-
marises his critique of theories of this kind, introduces his own view 
and dismisses in a rather summary fashion both Fuller and Dworkin. 
Of the two the first half is by far the better. It displays the full 
power of Soper's mind, his penetrating insight which fastens on to es-
sentials, uncovers unstated presuppositions, and highlights connec-
tions and continuities in the various philosophical traditions. He 
writes for those familiar with the work of the theorists under consider-
ation. All those who have the required knowledge to appreciate his 
arguments will find the works discussed illuminated by the penetrating 
beam of Soper's searching gaze. And yet, unfortunately, even that im-
pressive discussion is marred by some important distortions and mis-
understandings. Let me give a few examples. 
Soper claims that Hart must justify his view that acceptance of the 
rule of recognition by the officials is a necessary feature of law by 
showing that this feature is important given human concerns and in-
terests. He thinks that Hart's answer "is the suggestion that the puz-
zled or ignorant person might want to conform to society's 
expectations regardless of accompanying sanctions" (p. 24). By this 
Soper means conformity for conformity's sake. This greatly distorts 
Hart's meaning. His point is that to understand society one has to see 
it as members of that society see it. Legal officials do not see them-
selves as gunmen writ large. They accept the system. That fact is 
understood in the society at large. This is not an empirical generaliza-
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tion but a conceptual truth. Law is a public institution the general 
features of which (i.e., the features which make it law) are known to 
the public (though the public may not think of them as the features 
which account for the legal character of the law). Hart does not spell 
out but takes for granted that we all know that the difference between 
an institution resting on acceptance and one resting on the threat of 
resort to physical force is relevant to many human concerns. Clearly 
whether one wishes to judge (morally or otherwise) the behaviour of 
the officials, or to judge the viability of the institution, or to judge its 
likely response to various contingencies, one would be greatly influ-
enced by whether it rests on acceptance or on force. 
Soper is right to say that the difference will be important to those 
subject to the law who wish to decide whether they ought to obey it. 
But Hart does not suggest that the difference is more important to the 
ignorant than to the wise, nor that it is relevant only to those whose 
instinct is to follow the herd. He was merely pointing out the exist-
ence of such people. Because they do exist an account oflaw is correct 
only if it makes room for them. An account based on a stronger no-
tion of recognition, one which claims that the law exists only if its 
subjects believe in moral reasons for the validity of its rules, is vitiated 
by not making room for such people. 
Soper's mistake is typical, for it shows how his single-minded con-
centration on the question of why one should obey the law blinds him 
to the existence of wider human interests. Similarly, his implied asser-
tion that according to Hart it is desirable that both officials and sub-
jects have "normative allegiance" to the law6 is a lapse which may 
betray a fundamental misunderstanding of Hart's theory. Hart does 
indeed say that acceptance of the rule of recognition by officials is a 
necessary feature of law. But he neither says nor implies that it is 
desirable that they or other members of the community should have 
this attitude. To say so is, according to Hart, not to explain the con-
cept of law but to commend the existence of law and to commend 
obedience to it wherever it exists. For all we know from Hart's theory 
of law he may be a radical anarchist who regards any attitude of nor-
mative allegiance as thoroughly immoral. 
Similar misunderstandings plague the second part of chapter two 
as well. They are aggravated by Soper's tendency to lump all the theo-
ries he disagrees with into one or two archetypes. Soper's adversary is 
the legal theorist or the positivist. It turns out that the positivist 
thinks that an obligation to obey cannot exist without coincidence of 
normative outlook (p. 40, and elsewhere). Soper agrees that this can-
not mean that the positivist believes that the law is to be obeyed only if 
it has some moral merit. Coincidence of normative outlook means 
agreement in judgment about the merit of a law; it means that one is 
6. See p. 38 (toward the foot of the page). 
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obligated to obey only laws which are just and good. I know of no one 
who held such a view. All the political and moral theorists I have any 
acquaintance with held that either consent or the fear that disobeying 
bad laws may lead to breakdown of law and order are grounds of 
obligation. 
It also appears to Soper that "the legal theorist's determination to 
remain neutral" on the question whether there is an obligation to obey 
"equates belief with reality: all that is necessary for a system to be 
normative in the appropriate legal sense is for officials to display the 
appropriate normative belief, however false or even insincere" (p. 49). 
If the appropriate legal sense of normativity means a moral obligation 
to obey the law then anyone who says that belief in an obligation en-
tails its existence is indeed guilty of confusing belief with reality. But 
he could hardly be accused of neutrality on the issue whether such an 
obligation exists. If, on the other hand, the legal sense of normativity 
is that the law is normative because it rests on acceptance, and not on 
force, then the theorist is neutral but far from confusing belief with 
reality he is at pains to keep them apart. 
Misunderstandings of the same kind appear elsewhere in the book. 
One example will serve. Soper seems to attribute to Kelsen the view 
that law differs from organised coercion because it rests on the general 
belief of the subject population in its justice (pp. 31, 95). But Kelsen 
was anxious to dissociate himself from such views. 7 The beauty and 
subtlety of Kelsen's view is that he believed that, like beauty, norma-
tivity is in the eye of the beholder. Those who interpret a coercive 
system as a system of law regard it as normative. They presuppose the 
basic norm, i.e., the rule that the law is valid and ought to be obeyed. 
Kelsen is uncommitted as to whether all or any of the law's subjects 
make this presupposition. It is not part of the conditions for the exist-
ence of law that they do, and certainly not that they should. 
III. A THEORY OF LAW 
I have claimed that the foundations of legal theory are necessarily 
value-laden and that this fact was recognised by some of the founding 
fathers of legal positivism. It was recognised by Bentham, who also 
saw that evaluative considerations may well lead to the endorsement 
of a value-free criterion for the identification of the law. What is law 
and what is not is a matter of fact. That it is a matter of fact is deter-
mined, in part, by evaluative considerations. Soper, I have claimed, 
makes the existence of law a moral question, and thus he contradicts 
his own view that what is law is determined by the views, attitudes and 
actions of those subject to the law. Examination of this point is neces-
7. See H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 7, 218 & n.83 (2d ed. 1967). 
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sary to vindicate my comments in section one, and will lead us into the 
heart of Soper's theory of law. 
Soper is aware that a theory of law which defines it as necessarily 
moral, that is, a theory of law based on what I described as his own 
basic maxim, is untenable. He distinguishes between his own theory 
and some other natural law theories: "Instead of defining law to en-
sure that it always obligates, one seeks an account that explains why it 
has any tendency to obligate at all. In this way an independent con-
cept of law is preserved, distinct from that of morality" (p. 59). I shall 
refer to this as Soper's methodological principle. As Soper himself 
observes, it is essentially the approach which I dubbed "the derivative 
approach":8 "That is, my claim is not that 'law' is itself a moral con-
cept, like 'justice,' but that, like 'promise,' it is identified by nonmoral 
features (supreme force and belief in justice) which necessarily have 
moral worth" (p. 92). 
Soper then proceeds to suggest that I reject the derivative ap-
proach. This is a mistake. While discussing various conditions that 
the derivative approach must meet, my purpose was neither to criticise 
nor to endorse it9 but to point out that it is compatible with some of 
the tenets of legal positivism. Indeed it is compatible with the only 
essentially positivist thesis that I was willing to endorse, namely the 
"sources thesis." The sources thesis asserts that the identification of 
the content and existence of the law is a matter of fact. This is pre-
cisely Soper's own assertion, or implication, in the two previous quota-
tions from his book. If his theory lived up to his own aspirations it 
could join the list of other natural law theories, like those of Fuller and 
Finnis, 10 which are compatible with the sources thesis, thus vindicat-
ing my claim that it is a mistake to think that the legal positivist and 
the natural law traditions are inherently incompatible. 
By endorsing the basic maxim Soper contradicts his own descrip-
tion of his own theory. He endorses the definitional approach which 
precisely does "define law to ensure that it always obligates." The 
tension between these two incompatible methodological positions 
shows at the heart of his explanation of law. 
The book contains a one page section entitled "A Theory of Law." 
Its distilled message is: "Legal systems are essentially characterised by 
8. The derivative approach regards the existence of law as a matter of fact and proceeds to 
argue that, given valid moral premises, the facts necessary for the existence of law assure it of 
some moral value. Whether or not this claim, strictly interpreted, is true, the thought of a legal 
system devoid of all moral merit is no less fantastic than the thought of a legal system which is 
perfect beyond improvement. It is surely the case that all legal systems have both merits and 
demerits. My objection was to the belief that if all legal systems have some moral merit then it 
follows that there is an obligation to obey them. See J. RAz, PRACTICAL REAsoN AND NORMS 
165-70 (1975). 
9. See id. 
10. See generally Soper, Legal Theory and the Problem of Definition, supra note 1 (review of 
J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980)). 
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the belief in value, the claim in good faith by those who rule that they 
do so in the interests of all . . . . Law combines the organised sanc-
tion with the claim to justice by those who wield the sanction" (p. 55). 
I shall follow Soper and will refer to the quotation as Soper's theory of 
law. Is this theory inconsistent with legal positivism as Soper claims? 
Since belief in value may be misplaced, since what a person believes is 
essentially on the factual side of the fact/value divide, the theory ap-
pears to be a positivistic one making the existence and contents of law 
depend exclusively on matters of fact. 
Compare, for example, Soper's theory oflaw with my views on the 
matter (which he regards as a species of positivism). I am not the first 
to have argued that "the law claims authority. The Law presents itself 
as a body of authoritative standards."11 Soper's theory seems to differ 
from my view in two respects. First, he claims whereas I do not that a 
system of rules is a legal one only if the people in authority believe in 
the claim to authority which the law makes. Second, he attributes to 
those in authority, and I do not, the belief that they govern in the 
interest of all. Of these (and the context of our respective remarks 
makes clear that they are the only) differences between these views of 
ours, the first is real but apparently insignificant, and the second, sig-
nificant but apparent only. Let me explain. 
Whatever mileage Soper hopes to make out of the first difference in 
constructing his argument for an obligation to obey the law, its real 
significance is minimal. He agrees that ordinary common sense is un-
likely to deny a legal system that status on the ground that its officials 
are all too often hypocritical in their profession of belief in the value of 
the system they operate.12 It would be readily admitted on the one 
hand that a legal sytem all of whose officials are entirely and systemat-
ically hypocritical is a most unlikely possibility, and on the other hand 
that it is more than likely that in many countries some legal officials 
are hypocritical. Either way, whether it is an essential feature of law 
that its officials believe in its value or merely that they claim that they 
do, both properties are on the factual side of the fact/value distinction. 
Thus, the first difference between Soper and myself is apparently 
rather insignificant and fails to show where he deviates from well-
tested positivist paths. 13 
Soper's assertion that law exists only if the rulers claim to rule in 
the interests of the governed marks a more substantial disagreement 
between us. In arguing that a claim to a right to rule is a mark of law, 
I was mindful of the possibility of theocratic states whose governments 
govern in pursuit, as they see it, of divine commands and interests 
which may radically conflict with the interests of the governed. The 
11. J. RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 33 (1979). 
12. See, e.g., pp. 154-61. 
13. But see p. 742 infra for my explanation of why this appearance is misleading. 
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latter may be regarded as immaterial except when they coincide with 
the higher interests or happen to serve them. I was also aware of the 
theoretical possibility of a government coming to the conclusion, as 
did Moses regarding the whole generation of the Israelites in the de-
sert, that the interests of a whole generation have to be sacrificed for 
the sake of future generations. On a plain reading of Soper's theory of 
law (as explained on p. 55) such societies are not governed by law. 
They fail to qualify not because of the atrocities they perpetrate (re-
member that the sacrificial policies they pursue may be enthusiasti-
cally supported by the entire population), but because of the morality 
their rulers uphold. 
As the following chapters make clear, this important disagreement 
between Soper and me is only apparent. Soper notes that slaves and 
conquered people are often oppressed by regimes that believe in the 
justification of slavery and other forms of exploitation and oppression. 
Officials who accept the beliefs that underlie such moral judgments are 
acting in the interests of justice and fairness as they see it, and in that 
sense in the interests of all (including the disadvantaged group .... ) 
Thus, tempting though it may be to derive a substantive constraint from 
a theory that requires acting in the interests of all, the constraint is 
empty, as formal equality always is. [P. 121.] 
The temptation here mentioned is indeed to be resisted. But not for 
the reason stated. Soper seems to misunderstand his own theory. His 
theory of law does not establish a right that governments should act in 
the interest of the governed, nor does it establish a duty on them to do 
so. It merely claims that if they do not, then they are coercive orders 
rather than legal ones. He gives no reason to think that coercive or-
ders cannot do a lot of good, nor does he attempt to show that they are 
not, in some circumstances, preferable to legal orders. The fact that 
we all take for granted that normally the reverse is the case is neither 
here nor there. 
The temptation Soper mentions should indeed be resisted. But the 
interest of the passage I quoted lies elsewhere, for it withdraws the 
only aspect of his definition of law which separates his view from 
mine. Soper, it seems, has an idiosyncratic view of people's interests. 
It is a commonplace that morality sometimes calls on people to sacri-
fice their own interests for the sake of others. Soper disagrees. On the 
evidence of the passage quoted above, it appears that he thinks that a 
soldier who volunteers, out of moral conviction, to go to a certain 
death in order to save his friends is really pursuing his own interest, 
which happens to be to sacrifice himself. 14 Given that understanding 
of people's interests, Soper's theory of law amounts to saying that 
14. Soper's argument at pp. 149-50 suggests that if my volunteer acts for other reasons he 
may not actually be pursuing his own self interest. Soper says there that a tyrant who puts his 
own interest above morality (which in the circumstances imagined requires him to rule in the 
interest of his subjects) is not acting in their interest even though he believes himself to be acting 
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"legal systems are essentially characterized by . . the claim in good 
faith by those who rule that they do so" (p. 55) in pursuit of valid 
moral principles (whether or not these serve the interest of the gov-
erned in the ordinary understanding of such interests). 
Am I saying that Soper's theory is really a familiar variant of legal 
positivist themes? Not quite. My claim is that the distinctive part of 
his theory of law is not in the doctrine he calls his theory of law but in 
his theory of natural rights. The latter theory is explained in chapter 
five, which is misleadingly entitled "Applications." In fact, this chap-
ter introduces for the first time a doctrine which, while being presup-
posed by the political principle explained in chapter three, is not 
supported by it. This doctrine lies at the heart of Soper's philosophy 
and is one of his two major novel theses in the book.15 
Natural rights "are rights against the state which can be invaded 
or ignored only at the cost oflosing the title oflaw" (p. 132). Note the 
accuracy of this explanation. Natural rights are moral rights, and to 
establish their validity as rights one resorts to moral argument; one 
consults, as it were, one's moral theory. Moral rights are natural ones 
because they coincide with the necessary conditions without which a 
social order is not a legal but a coercive one.16 Hence, the doctrine of 
natural rights reveals Soper's view of the necessary features of law. It, 
more than his theory of law, illuminates the difference, according to 
him, between a legal and a coercive order. 
Soper claims to discern two such rights: a right to "that minimum 
of security that underlies the judgment that any legal system is better 
than none" (p. 130), and a right to discourse (pp. 134-43). Soper says 
little about the content of his alleged natural rights. My main diffi-
culty is not, however, with their content but with the reasons for 
thinking that they are natural rights in the sense explained. 
So far as I can see Soper has one argument for the naturalness of 
the right to security and two in support of the naturalness of the right 
to discourse. I emphasise that naturalness is the only issue Soper dis-
cusses because his way of writing may mislead many readers into tak-
ing him to claim that he has established the existence of rights to 
correctly and justifiably. The difference is, presumably, that he does not think that it is morality 
which calls on him to prefer his interests to those of his subjects. 
15. I assume that his statement that the court is "an institution the primary function of 
which is to assume this responsibility of justifying the manner in which sanctions are imposed 
and disputes resolved" (p. 113) only sounds novel because of its rhetorical exaggeration. Pre-
sumably Soper would admit that the difference between a department of information and propa· 
ganda and a court is that while both explain the way sanctions are applied and disputes resolved, 
only the second applies sanctions and resolves disputes. 
Another controversial thesis he endorses is that "the essential difference between court and 
legislature consists in the constraint placed on the former, but not on the latter, to reach deci-
sions in accordance with preexisting (presumably legal) standards. Judges find the law; legisla-
tures make it" (p. 110). Unfortunately Soper does not explain or defend this claim. 
16. See pp. 130, 132. 
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security and discourse against all governments, rights which are le-
gally binding independently of any legislation or judicial recognition. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. Soper assumes without argu-
ment that people have rights to minimum security and to discourse 
against their government. He argues that these are natural rights, that 
is, that a government which violates them would be administering a 
system of coercion rather than law. But nowhere does he argue that 
natural rights are legal rights. All his argument purports to show is 
that the rights are not violated in law. But rights can remain inviolate 
without being recognised as rights. A country which does not have 
conscription, to give but one example, does not violate anyone's right 
of conscientious objection, assuming people have such a moral right. 
It does not follow that it recognises a legal right of conscientious ob-
jection. For all that Soper tells us neither of his natural rights need be 
legal rights. 
Let us tum to Soper's arguments for the naturalness of his two 
natural rights. The reason to regard the right to minimum security as 
a natural one is that without such security, having a system of law is 
no better than having no such system. Therefore, as we shall see be-
low, if there could be such a law undermining minimum security, 
there would be no obligation to obey it. This contradicts the basic 
maxim (i.e., that law is such that it is obligatory to obey it). Therefore 
there can be no such law. The startling aspect of this argument is that 
it flatly contradicts Soper's methodological principle. It now turns out 
that organised force and the rulers' belief in the moral rightness of 
their actions is not enough to assure a social order of legal status. It 
may still be nothing but a gunman situation writ large unless it also 
assures one of minimum security. 
Soper gives us no reason to believe that a social order meeting the 
only two conditions stipulated by his theory of law cannot infringe 
people's right to minimum security. On the contrary, he seems to rec-
ognize that it can do so.17 He needs not a contingent argument, like 
Hart's, to the effect that law which systematically violates minimum 
security is unlikely to survive. He needs a conceptual argument estab-
lishing the conceptual impossibility of there being law which infringes 
the right to security. The only argument Soper makes is that one 
would not be obligated to obey it were it to exist. Thus, Soper is im-
paled on the horns of a dilemma. Either he gives up his methodologi-
cal principle and admits that his conception of natural law is 
definitional - he identifies the essential features of the law because of 
their moral significance, and their moral significance is his only reason 
for regarding them as essential to law. Or he has to abandon his basic 
maxim and concede that it is not necessarily the case that there is an 
17. Seep. 183 n. 15 & 17 (The case of slaves whose interests are sacrificed: for them no 
personal security is assured.). 
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obligation to obey the law. The question "what is law that I should 
obey it?" has no answer, for it rests on a false premise. 
Soper's arguments for the naturalness of the right to discourse fare 
no better. One relies on an empirical generalisation: rulers who deny 
the right to discourse are unlikely to be sincere believers in the moral 
rightness of their own actions (p. 135). Whatever one may think of 
this as an empirical generalisation is immaterial. The naturalness of 
the right can be established only by an exceptionless conceptual neces-
sity. The second argument is to the effect that denial of a right to 
discourse shows that the rulers do not respect their subjects (pp. 136-
40). This lack of respect absolves the subjects of the obligation to obey 
the law, according to the political theory to be discussed below. From 
here the argument is identical to that for the right to security. If there 
could be such a law it would be a law one is not obligated to obey. 
Therefore, it would contradict the basic maxim. Therefore it cannot 
exist. Violation of the right to discourse can be purchased, then, only 
at the price of losing the right to the title of law. Therefore, the right 
to discourse is a natural right. 
Given these premises, so it is. Unfortunately the premises land 
Soper again in the same dilemma. He must either drop his method-
ological principle and allow that he holds certain features to be essen-
tial for law for no other reason than that they endow it with moral 
value, or he must discard his basic maxim and allow for the existence 
of non-obligating law. 
It may be worth noting that Soper holds that respect for their sub-
jects is a conceptual condition of the sincerity of the rulers' belief in 
the moral justification of their actions. His notion of sincerity is such 
that it is impossible for rulers both sincerely to believe in the moral 
justification of their actions and to lack respect (that is, lack the re-
spect which expresses itself in the right of discourse) for their subjects. 
So whether a person is sincere or not turns out not to be a matter of 
fact, but of morality. Something like the following may be a general-
ised statement of the principle Soper seems to presuppose: Only those 
who respect others are capable of having sincere beliefs on the moral-
ity of action affecting those others. Given this interpretation of sincer-
ity (though I am unclear as to why Soper adopts it), the first 
apparently innocuous difference between his theory of law and my 
view of the matter turns out to be of major significance. 
IV. THE OBLIGATION TO OBEY THE LAW 
It is plain, on the other hand, why Soper thinks that respect for the 
subjects is a condition of legality. His argument for an obligation to 
obey the law, the second major innovation of the book, depends on it. 
Three premises entail a prima facie obligation to obey the law (pp. 78, 
80): 
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(1) "[T]he enterprise of law in general - including the particular sys-
tem, defective though it may be, that confronts an individual - is better 
than no law at all." 
(2) There is "a good faith effort by those in charge to govern" in the 
light of valid moral principles. [This second premise understood in So-
per's special way includes, as we saw above, a further premise:] 
(3) The rulers respect the ruled. 
The advantage of law over no law at all is, according to Soper, that 
law secures minimum safety. He consciously endorses a Hobbesian 
position on this issue in order to make sure that he does not pitch his 
claim for the law too high. Much needs be said about Soper's prem-
ises. Having discussed them briefly in the previous section we should, 
however, press on. Do the premises support his conclusion? His con-
clusion is very far-reaching. It will establish not merely an obligation 
to obey the law in an essentially decent society; it reaches further and 
asserts an obligation to obey any legal system which observes his two 
natural rights. At times Soper makes it appear as if these conditions 
establish quite a lot, as if they establish mutuality of respect between 
rulers and their subjects and the genuine attempt by the rulers to fur-
ther the interests of all their subjects in a rational, reasoned and open-
minded way. Most of the time, however, Soper is cautious enough to 
warn against such a reading of his theory. Though law necessarily 
observes the two natural rights, they are very minimal. It appears, for 
example, that even Nazi Germany conformed to the conditions of le-
gality sufficiently to impose on most of its subjects an obligation to 
obey (p. 92). Can his meagre premises support so strong a conclusion? 
Can the obligation to obey depend to such an extent on the convictions 
of the rulers, regardless of the morality of their actions? 
Soper's basic idea is simple. There is a job that needs to be done, 
the job of government. Someone is faithfully trying to do it. Other 
things being equal, such a person deserves one's respect. So far so 
good. The problem starts when we try to understand why that respect 
involves an obligation to obey the law. I believe that Soper is trading 
on two recognised sources of respect and obligation. First there is re-
spect for an enterprise which is not merely a valuable enterprise, but 
also my enterprise. Every individual's attitude toward his own gov-
ernment should be not merely that they have a job which they are 
doing their best to carry out. There is a common enterprise in which 
both rulers and subjects should engage, the enterprise of promoting 
the good of the community. The rulers are trying to do their share. 
They may be failing, but at least they are trying in good faith. Their 
failure does not violate one's natural rights, and therefore has not de-
prived the common enterprise of all its point. It is in this spirit that 
Soper refers to respect for law based on "equal commitment to the 
search for truth and humility about the correctness of one's conclu-
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sions" (p. 82). 18 
The second recognised source of obligation Soper is invoking is the 
duty not to frustrate and upset people who are doing their best. They 
deserve that one should spare their feelings. The rulers would be hurt 
and offended if their best efforts on our behalf were to be met with 
rebuff in the form of disobedience. Therefore one is (prima facie) obli-
gated to obey in order to spare their feelings. In this vein, which 
dominates in the book, Soper observes that while "disobedience can-
not easily be linked to societal disintegration; . . . it can be linked in 
an ascending scale of sadness, disappointment, concern, anxiety, and 
fear on the part of those who think the laws are important and my 
obedience desirable" (p. 86). Therefore, the more they care about my 
compliance the stronger my duty is to comply (pp. 87, 153). 
I can see no way of merging these two underlying strands, if indeed 
I am right to find them in Soper's argument. Moreover, neither of 
them can support Soper's conclusion. Respect for law out of a sense 
of participation in a joint enterprise is, in its proper place, a real moral 
concern. It should indeed lead one to uphold laws which one finds to 
be less than ideal. One reason is the humility and the sense of one's 
own fallibility that Soper mentions. Another is the fact that, in many 
cases in which one's action makes a difference to a joint enterprise, one 
does more to promote the good and prevent evil by supporting the 
partners to that enterprise than by opposing them. Soper is aware that 
this last consideration cannot be the foundation of an obligation to 
obey the law, however weak. 
First, it is simply not the case that one's actions in breaking the law 
always make a difference to the enterprise. Quite often they do not. 
Furthermore, it is not necessarily the case that citizens and govern-
ments are engaged in a joint enterprise. The divergence of opinion 
about morality between me and a Nazi government or between me and 
a fundamentalist Muslim government is so great that I would deny 
that just because they believe in the rightness of their action there is 
some joint pursuit in which we are partners (assuming that I am their 
subject). 
Nor is Soper's argument from humility and fallibility any help. 
While aware of one's own fallibility one is also aware of the fallibility 
of the government. One should be cautious in believing oneself right 
and the rest of the world wrong, especially in matters in which others 
have greater expertise or experience or judgment. We discount our 
own opinions for such reasons many times every day. But we judge 
the action of others and their credentials before we trust them. Do the 
18. At times Soper sounds as if he sees the situation as one in which respect for law is merely 
the pursuit of long-term self-interest, see p. 84, but such passages are really concerned with the 
truth of the premises of his argument enumerated above. They are liable to mislead if read as 
explanations of why those premises support the conclusion. 
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considerations of humility show that one should support racist poli-
cies, even if only prima facie? Would not such support make one par-
ticipant to a racist enterprise? I confess that neither these nor any 
other examples can really carry the day against a claim that there is a 
prima facie obligation. All objections seem easy to deflect on the 
ground that they merely show that the obligation is overridden, not 
that it does not exist. But certain forms of racism and other iniquities 
perpetrated by legal systems all over the world, even those which meet 
Soper's conditions of legality, are such that the very belief that one ~as 
a prima facie obligation to go along with them makes one guilty by 
association. 
Ultimately the first source of obligation, participation in a joint 
enterprise, fails to establish an obligation to obey, for such participa-
tion merely requires doing that which contributes to the success of the 
enterprise. But Soper argues for an obligation to obey those whose 
actions lead to the failure of the enterprise. Respect for them as joint 
entrepreneurs requires frustrating them rather than obeying them. A 
sense of a shared enterprise gives one license to act against one's part-
ner's wishes where but for the partnership one would not be allowed to 
interfere. If we go on an expedition together, I may be entitled to use 
force to restrain you from some very damaging action which will lead 
to the expedition's failure even though I may not use the same means 
to save a stranger from failure in an enterprise of which I am not a 
part. This explains why citizens care more than foreigners about evils 
perpetrated by their own government even when they do not suffer 
from them. It explains why citizens feel free to engage in civil disobe-
dience whereas visiting foreigners do not. Respect arising out of the 
existence of a joint enterprise may actually undermine any obligation 
to obey an unjust government rather than support it. 
Soper's second source of obligation, the need to spare the feelings 
of the rulers, 19 is both too strong and too weak to serve as a founda-
tion of an obligation to obey the law. It is too weak because it applies 
19. In a footnote Soper explains: "I have cast the theory in terms of respect for 'those in 
charge' only because that is the limiting case of law; in most cases, those who accept the system 
and thus deserve respect will include citizens as well as officials." P. 179 n.36. Naturally the 
argument has to hold in the limiting case if it is to be valid at all. That is why Soper concentrates 
on the limiting case, and why I commented on it in those terms. Paradoxically Soper fails to 
notice that the conditions which he rightly regards as normal, le., in which sections of the popu-
lation share the attitude of those in charge, do not strengthen his argument at all. The respect for 
the rulers, he claims, is based on the fact that they are the rulers, that they do their best to carry 
out a necessary job. By-standers may share the values and attitude of the rulers. But being by-
standers they do not deserve that respect. (It is arguable that voters, or at least those who actu-
ally vote, are themselves among the rulers. J. Austin, for example, held that the British sovereign 
is not Parliament but those who have a right to elect it. I am not arguing who should count as a 
ruler. My only concern is with the claim that similar respect is owed to members of the public 
who share the attitude of the rulers toward the law.) They do, of course, deserve the respect that 
is due to all humanity. But then it does not matter that they are citizens of one's own country. 
On that argument the population of Poland ought to obey the laws of Poland in order not to hurt 
the feelings of Chernenko, or those of the commander-in-chief of the Soviet army. Most of the 
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only to law-breaking acts the commission of which will be or is likely 
to become known to the officials. Right now, sitting by myself in the 
study late at night, I can think of some dozen offences I can commit 
within the next half hour of which no one will know if I choose not to 
let my secret out. Besides, the vast majority of violations of law are 
infringements of private rights. The overwhelming majority of these 
will never reach official notice, and were always known to be most 
unlikely to do so. 
In any event, Soper's argument applies only if the rulers mind if 
their laws are not obeyed. I do indeed hope that they do mind. I 
myself, and almost everyone I know, mind if valuable laws are reck-
lessly disregarded or deliberately flouted. If Soper does not count the 
need to spare my feelings as a ground for an obligation to obey the law 
this is presumably because I am not involved in the legal system in the 
way which will make my feelings count. But if so it is reasonable to 
assume that one should give special consideration only to those feel-
ings of the rulers which result from the fact that they make and en-
force the law, the feelings which are not shared by ordinary citizens. 
(One would not feel obliged, for example, to spare the rulers' feelings 
in private matters entirely unconnected with their official functions 
just because their official functions obligate us to spare their feelings.) 
One should, in other words, avoid engendering feelings of unap-
preciated or frustrated authorship (which distinguishes the rulers from 
the rest of us). One may well doubt, however, whether such feelings 
are widespread among the rulers. Many of them are just doing a job. 
They care about success or failure. But one would have to be very 
presumptuous to assume that one's petty violations would make a dif-
ference to their feelings, or that they are likely to make such a 
difference. 
Another thought is relevant here. Do we really want to encourage 
the sort of feelings that Soper's argument presupposes? It is true that 
we do not like "the unthinking invocation of ritual and rote" (p. 153). 
But for myself I would replace it with a dedication to the task coupled 
with a sense of moral responsibility, and would shy away from the 
personal involvement which leads to continuous frustrations when 
others fail to do as one wishes. This last attitude on which Soper mod-
els his political theory is both undesirable and, luckily, rarer than he 
thinks. 
Soper's argument is too strong because it does not apply to the law 
alone. Much governmental business nowadays is carried out not by 
the use of public law powers but through the conduct of economic 
policies. Those have little to do with the achievement of minimum 
security for people. Nor do most laws have much to do with that task. 
points I make in the text against the argument from respect to the rulers apply to any arguments 
based on respect to those who share their views as well. 
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If it is better to have law, however imperfect, than to have no law at 
all, then it is also better to have government, even with imperfect poli-
cies, than to have no government at all. So if there is prima facie 
obligation to obey the law, there is also a prima facie obligation to 
follow government policy recommendations. If the President advises 
all employees to forgo any wage demands in the coming year, then 
there is a prima facie obligation to do so. There can be little doubt 
that in a case like this he will be frustrated and upset if people do not 
take his advice. I venture to regard this as a reductio ad absurdum of 
Soper's argument. 
CONCLUSION 
There is much in the book that I did not mention. In particular I 
did not comment on the excellence of many of Soper's critical discus-
sions. His discussion of the frequent abuse of considerations of cer-
tainty (pp. 102-07), for example, should be taken to heart by all the 
positivists and realists who all too often rely on the need for certainty 
in a most unthinking manner. While focusing on the book's novel 
ideas I could not do full justice to its value in stimulating discussion 
and re-examination of old ideas. I failed to discuss Soper's use of para-
digms and his revival of the provocative paradigm of parental relations 
as a model of political authority. There is much in the book to delight 
as well as to infuriate. This reader's ultimate conclusion is, however, 
that Soper has failed to make good his aspiration to provide us with a 
cogent new theory of law and political obligation.20 
20. I am grateful to Kent Greenawalt for letting me see his co=ents on chapter three, to be 
published in the proceedings of the March 1984 Hart conference in Jerusalem. 
